#### Only our criticism can explain insidious violence carried out in the name of optimizing life and society—their criticism can only explain the creation of the inhuman and violence against an ontologically devalued being

Mitchell **Dean**, Professor, Sociology, Macquarie University, STATES OF IMAGINATION: ETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATIONS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL STATE, ed. T.B. Hansen & F. Stepputat, 20**01**, p. 54-56.

There is thus a kind of perverse homogeneity between the power over life and the power to take life characteristic of biopower. The emergence of a biopolitical racism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be approached as a trajectory in which this homogeneity always threatened to tip over into a dreadful necessity. This racism can be approached as a fundamental mechanism of power that is inscribed in the biopolitical domain (Stoker 1995: 84-85). For Foucault, the primary function of this form of racism is to establish a division between those who must live and those who must die, and to distinguish the superior from the inferior, the fit from the unfit. The notion and techniques of population had given rise, at the end of the nineteenth century, to a new linkage among population, the internal organization of states, and the competition between states. Darwinism, as an imperial social and political program, would plot the ranking of individuals, populations, and nations along the common gradient of fitness and thus measure efficiency.6 However, the series "population, evolution, and race" is not simply a way of thinking about the superiority of the "white races" or of justifying colonialism, but also of thinking about how to treat the degenerates and the abnormals in one's own population and prevent the further degeneration of the race. The second and most important function for Foucault of this biopolitical racism in the nineteenth century is that "it establishes a positive relation between the right to kill and the assurance of life" (Stoler 1995: 84). The life of the population, its vigor, its health, its capacities to survive, becomes necessarily linked to the elimination of internal and external threats. This power to disallow life is perhaps best encapsulated in the injunctions of the eugenic project: identify those who are degenerate, abnormal, feeble-minded, or of an inferior race and subject them to forced sterilization; encourage those who are superior, fit, and intelligent to propagate. Identify those whose life is but mere existence and disqualify their propagation; encourage those who can partake of a sovereign existence and of moral and political life. But this last example does not necessarily establish a positive justification for the right to kill, only the right to disallow life. If we are to begin to understand the type of racism engaged in by Nazism, however, we need to take into account another kind of denouement between the biopolitical management of population and the exercise of sovereignty. This version of sovereignty is no longer the transformed and democratized form founded on the liberty of the juridical subject, as it is for liberalism, but a sovereignty that takes up and transforms a further element of sovereignty, as “symbolics of blood" (Foucault 1979a: 148). For Foucault, sovereignty is grounded in blood-as a reality and as a symbol—just as one might say that sexuality becomes the key field on which biopolitical management of populations is articulated. When power is exercised through repression and deduction, through a law over which hangs the sword, when it is exercised on the scaffold by the torturer and the executioner. and when relations between households and families were forged through alliance, "blood was a reality with a symbolic function." By contrast, for biopolitics with its themes to health, vigor, fitness, vitality, progeny, survival, and race, "power spoke of sexuality and to sexuality" (Foucault 1979a: 147). For Foucault (I979~l: 149-50), the novelty of National Socialism was the way it articulated "the oneiric exaltation of blood," of fatherland, and of the triumph of the race in an immensely cynical and naïve fashion, with the paroxysms of a disciplinary and biopolitical power concerned with the detailed administration of the life of the population and the regulation of sexuality, family, marriage, and education. Nazism generalized biopower without the limit-critique posed by the juridical subject of right, but it could not do away with sovereignty. Instead, it established a set of permanent interventions into the conduct of the individual within the population and articulated this with the "mythical concern for blood and the triumph of the race." Thus, the shepherd-flock game and the city-citizen game are transmuted into the eugenic ordering of biological existence (of mere living and subsistence) and articulated on the themes of the purity of blood and the myth of the fatherland. In such an articulation of these elements of sovereign and biopolitical forms of power, the relation between the administration of life and the right to kill entire populations is no longer simply one of a dreadful homogeneity. It has become a necessary relation. The administration of life comes to require a bloodbath. It is not simply that power, and therefore war, will be exercised at the level of an entire population. It is that the act of disqualifying the right to life of other races becomes necessary for the fostering of the life of the race. Moreover, the elimination of other races is only one face of the purification of one's own race (Foucault 1997b: 231). The other part is to expose the latter to a universal and absolute danger, to expose in to the risk of death and total destruction. For Foucault, with the Nazi state we have an absolutely racist state, an absolutely murderous state and an absolutely suicidal state" all of which are superimposed and converge on the Final Solution. With the Final Solution, the state tries to eliminate, through the Jews all the other races, for whom the Jews were the symbol and the manifestation. This includes, in one of Hitler's last acts, the order to destroy the bases of bare life for the German people itself. "Final Solution for other races, the absolute suicide of the German race" is inscribed, according to Foucault, in the functioning of the state (232).

#### Ignores the fluid terrain power power

Brown 2009 – professor of history and of African and African American Studies specializing in Atlantic Slavery (Vincent, “Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery,” http://history.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/documents/brown-socialdeath.pdf)

African American history has grown from the kinds of people’s histories that emphasize a progressive struggle toward an ultimate victory over the tyranny of the powerful. Consequently, studies that privilege the perspectives of the enslaved depend in some measure on the chronicling of heroic achievement, and historians of slave culture and resistance have recently been accused of romanticizing their subject of study.42 Because these scholars have done so much to enhance our understanding of slave life beyond what was imaginable a scant few generations ago, the allegation may seem unfair. Nevertheless, some of the criticisms are helpful. As the historian Walter Johnson has argued, studies of slavery conducted within the terms of social history have often taken “agency,” or the self-willed activity of choice-making subjects, to be their starting point.43 Perhaps it was inevitable, then, that many historians would find themselves charged with depicting slave communities and cultures that were so resistant and so vibrant that the social relations of slavery must not have done much damage at all. Even if this particular accusation is a form of caricature, it contains an important insight, that the agency of the weak and the power of the strong have too often been viewed as simple opposites. The anthropologist David Scott is probably correct to suggest that for most scholars, the power of slaveholders and the damage wrought by slavery have been “pictured principally as a negative or limiting force” that “restricted, blocked, paralyzed, or deformed the transformative agency of the slave.”44 In this sense, scholars who have emphasized slavery’s corrosive power and those who stress resistance and resilience share the same assumption. However, the violent domination of slavery generated political action; it was not antithetical to it. If one sees power as productive and the fear of social death not as incapacity but as a generative force—a peril that motivated enslaved activity— a different image of slavery slides into view, one in which the object of slave politics is not simply the power of slaveholders, but the very terms and conditions of social existence.

#### This epistemological failure makes their impacts perpetual—they fail to see agency in slave actions

Vincent Brown 2009 (professor of history and of African and African American Studies “Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery,” <http://history.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/documents/brown-socialdeath.pdf>)

In fact, the funeral was an attempt to withstand the encroachment of oblivion and to make social meaning from the threat of anomie. As a final rite of passage and a ritual goodbye, the ceremony provided an outlet for anguish and an opportunity for commiseration. Yet it also allowed the women to publicly contemplate what it meant to be alive and enslaved. The death rite thus enabled them to express and enact their social values, to articulate their visions of what it was that bound them together, made individuals among them unique, and separated this group of people from others. The scene thus typifies the way that people who have been pronounced socially dead, that is, utterly alienated and with no social ties recognized as legitimate or binding, have often made a social world out of death itself. The funeral was an act of accounting, of reckoning, and therefore one among the multitude of acts that made up the political history of Atlantic slavery. This was politics conceived not as a conventional battle between partisans, but as a struggle to define a social being that connected the past and present. It could even be said that the event exemplified a politics of history, which connects the politics of the enslaved to the politics of their descendants. Although the deaths of slaves could inspire such active and dynamic practices of social reconnection, scholars in recent years have made too little of events like the funeral aboard the Hudibrasand have too often followed Orlando Patterson’s monumental Slavery and Social Death (1982) in positing a metaphorical “social death” as the basic condition of slavery. In a comparative study of sixty-six slaveholding societies ranging from ancient Greece and Rome to medieval Europe, precolonial Africa, and Asia, Patterson combined statistical analysis and voluminous research with brilliant theoretical insights drawn from Marxian theory, symbolic anthropology, law, philosophy, and literature in order to offer what he called a “preliminary definition of slavery on the level of personal relations.” Recognizing violence, violations of personhood, dishonor, and namelessness as the fundamental constituent elements of slavery, Patterson distilled a transhistorical characterization of slavery as “the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons.” In this way the institution of slavery was and is a “relation of domination,” in which slaveholders annihilated people socially by first extracting them from meaningful relationships that defined personal status and belonging, communal memory, and collective aspiration and then incorporating these socially dead persons into the masters’ world. As a work of historical sociology concerned primarily with the comparative analysis of institutions, the book illuminated the dynamics of a process whereby the “desocialized new slave” was subsumed within slave society.5

#### Genealogical interrogation is necessary to combat the securitized, biopolitical structures that edge out alternative discourses.

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(Delf, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg, International Relations, “Managing Climate Risks or Risking a Managerial Climate: State, Security, and Governance in the International Climate Regime,” September 5, 2011, Sage Publications//wyo-mm)

It is important to note that discourses in this perspective are not fixed entities but are contingent structures that are continually negotiated, meaning they are challenged and (re-)produced in discursive struggles. Discursive fields are thus arenas in which alternative interpretations of reality compete with each other. Nevertheless, there is always the possibility for certain discourses to become temporarily fixed. 18 Through repetition, articulations can become publicly accepted and consequently become taken for granted. Hegemonic discursive formations, then, define what can reasonably be said in a discursive field, and as a consequence alternative articulations are edged out. Hegemonic discursive formations are thus difficult to overcome because once they are established they are self-enforcing. 19 This implies a relatively path-dependent evolution of discourses. The concept of dislocative moments here refers to historical events that disrupt the established symbolic order, which open up a window of opportunity for alternative framings to evolve or be reinforced. 20 Following these considerations, I propose to understand the process of risk construction in international politics as a discursive struggle following the logic of path dependency with discursive changes mainly happening as a result of critical moments of dislocation. This change does not only refer to risk politics (what or who is constructed as a risk) but also on the specific ontology of risk itself. Thanks to Foucault we can understand risk not just as being discursively constructed but as a technology of government that was crucial in the evolution of the modern nation state. To account for the connections between political rationalities, technologies of government and forms of subjectivity of the governed, Foucault introduced the concept of ‘governmentality’.21 Following Foucault, we can identify in the genealogy of the modern state different ideal types of governmentality: biopolitics, liberalism and advanced liberal government, all of which pursue different rationalities and governmental technologies (of risk management). Under a biopolitical governmentality, instead of political power being focused on the person of the sovereign or the territory, it is concentrated on the population, which is considered as the object to be regulated and controlled by comprehensive risk management.22 This was enabled by the development of statistics in the context of natural and human sciences: probabilistic risk thus became a governmental resource.

#### And, our method doesn’t efface anti-blackness, but rather allows us to attend to the contextual nature of different historical instances of oppression

Mitchell **Dean**, Professor, Sociology, Macquarie University, GOVERNMENTALITY: POWER AND RULE IN MODERN SOCIETY, London: Sage, 19**99**, p. 45.

The second possibility is to use the analysis of the past to make the unfa­miliar familiar, to show that the past is not so different from today in certain respects. Here genealogy sets itself against the immodesty of all those attempts to turn the present into a momentous, apocalyptic time of massive ruptures and dire public and personal troubles. A key example of this is the tendency to regard a concern with self-identity, its fulfilment or transcen­dence, as a feature of the present moment defined as 'late' or 'post' modern times (e.g. Giddens, 1991). Drawing on the work of historians of culture and ideas, it is possible to show that many of the features held to be specific to the quest for self-identity in late modernity are part of the longer and more com­plex trajectory of techniques of conscience formation and 'spiritual exercises'. Thus we find the use of 'autobiographical' techniques among Roman philo­sophical schools, including the keeping of notebooks, writing letters to friends, and mnemonic devices such as the nightly self-examination recom­mended by Seneca (Foucault, 1988e; 1993; Hadot, 1995). Continuous or regular acts of self-interrogation, the scrutiny of innermost thoughts in the search for truth and authenticity, and the verbalization of that which pro­vokes resistance, are all present in John Cassian's fourth-century exposition of the practice of confession (Foucault, 1993). The point is not that we should erase all historical narratives of identity, fulfilment and transcendence, or that there are no differences between recent movements of personal liberation and ancient philosophical and religious schools, but that attention to partic­ular regimes of ethical practices or forms of asceticism reveal awkward continuities for those who claim, or even simply assume, the ruptural nature of the present.

#### The affirmative is a prerequisite to the alternative—our coterminous privilege and vulnerability evokes a parrhesiatic DUTY to challenge sovereign hegemony. This transgressive act stands outside of the constitutive frame of anti-blackness their evidence indicts and an alignment with parrhesia is the only way to challenge the ways that sovereignty continues to discipline and demarcate subjects and bodies

Havis 9

[Devonya, associate professor of philosophy at Virginia Union University, “Blackness Beyond Witness”, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 2009, p. gs //wyo-tjc]

In framing our discussion, I posit that these performative utterances ‘talk back’. In so far as blackness lies outside the modern western philosophic/epistemological framework, it functions as a disruption that creates openings for philosophical intervention – the activity ‘talking back’ or engaging parrhesia. There is a relationship between the notion of talking back and the Greek concept parrhesia. In drawing this correlation, my assertion is that both are central to acts of transgression and resistance because they set in motion a practice rather than a hegemonic commitment to liberation and revolution that eventually reinscribe another form of oppressive regime. Hence it is critical that we understand parrhesia as a critical means of engagement rather than a zealous attempt to force others to submit to a particular point of view. As such, parrhesia is different from rhetoric and fundamentalism. It hinges upon active questioning, exploration and critical examination with an interest toward effecting what is just.

It is clear then that Black Vernacular phenomena are parrhesiastic in character in so far as these phenomena operate in line with the parrhesiastic game. One who practises parrhesia, like the Black Vernacular community, ‘opens his heart and mind completely to other people through his discourse’.

Hence, parrhesia marks a particular relationship between the speaker and what is said. The one who practises parrhesia avoids rhetoric that would hide what he thinks and instead ‘acts on other people’s minds by showing them as directly as possible what he actually believes’. Hence, ‘the commitment involved in parrhesia is linked to a certain social situation, to a difference of status between the speaker and the audience, to the fact that the parrhesiastes says something which is dangerous to himself and thus involves risk’. In parrhesia, there is ‘always an exact coincidence between belief and truth. . . . [T]he coincidence between belief and truth does not take place in a (mental) experience, but in a verbal activity, namely parrhesia.’

While parrhesia involves speaking the truth, its primary function is not simply truth-telling but putting forth a criticism. Hence, the parrhesiastes is not focused on indicating the truth to someone else and/or convincing another of this truth. Instead, the speaker offers a criticism, renders a critique, of himself or another. Such a critique ‘comes from below . . . and is directed towards above’. One in the parrhesiastic attitude ‘risks his privilege to speak freely when he discloses a truth which threatens the majority’.

He assumes such risk as a matter of moral duty, as obligation because the speaker is not forced to speak and could, in fact, remain silent.

The duty assumed in parrhesia involves offering a critique that helps one to recognize what goes unseen where such seeing creates the possibility of correcting what is amiss. As such, there is a relationship, too, between parrhesia, freedom and duty. Foucault writes: . . . parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a speciﬁc relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through danger, a certain type of relation to himself and other people through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a speciﬁc relation to moral law through freedom and duty. More precisely, parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as himself). In parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, this risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of ﬂattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy.

Blackness in its phenomenal expression as Black Vernacular phenomena can be aligned with philosophy as parrhesiastic expression. In effect, the sound event, the ritual performance of blackness, draws attention to (as Foucault would say) ‘the way institutions, practices, habits, and behavior become a problem for people who behave in speciﬁc sorts of ways, who engage in certain types of habit’. 25 Moreover, the verbal activity of Black Vernacular phenomena call attention to the way an unproblematic ﬁeld of experience, or a set of practices which were accepted without question, which were familiar and silent, out of discussion, become a problem, raise discussion and debate, incite new reactions, and induces a crisis in the previously silent behavior, habits, practices, and institutions. The history of thought, understood in this way, is the history of the way people begin to take care of something.

I would add that the above description is the practice of philosophy and the activity of Black Vernacular phenomena. In fact, we might easily align the Socratic parrhesiastic attitude with Black Vernacular phenomena. Socrates offers philosophical intervention that ‘requires a personal, face to face relationship’. As one of the Platonic dialogues notes, Socrates’ ability to function as a touchstone, to offer philosophical intervention, has credibility because he is ‘musical’. He is someone who lives in a way that allows the speaker and his speech to harmonize with each other. To quote one of the interlocutors: ‘Socrates has tuned himself with the fairest harmony, not that of a lyre or other entertaining instrument, but has made a true concord of his own life between his words and his deeds.’

This ability to talk back – to simultaneously celebrate in sound and offer philosophical intervention, to critique – is crucial as we develop different strategies to negotiate our ethical and political lives as we do philosophy, because as Foucault writes: Without the right of criticism, the power exercised by a sovereign [read as government, state, etc.] is without limitation. Such power without limitation is . . . characterized as ‘joining fools in their foolishness’. Foe power without limitation is directly related to madness. The man who exercises power is wise only insofar as there exists someone who can use parrhesia to criticize him, thereby putting some limit to his power, to his command.

#### Even if the violence of anti-blackness is the founding antagonism of the social body, we must first begin with a genealogical decentering of subjectivity- that is the only way we can understand the PRODUCTIVITY of whiteness and the ways that it disciplines both black AND white bodies to DESIRE participation in the system of anti-blackness

Yancy 4

[George, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University and Coordinator of the Critical Race Theory Speaker Series, What White Looks Like, ed. Yancy, “A Foucauldian (Genealogical) Reading of Whiteness: The Production of the Black Body/Self and the Racial Deformation of Pecola Breedlove in Toni Morrison's The Bluest Eye”, p. questia //wyo-tjc]

IN THIS CHAPTER, I will explore the structure of whiteness within the framework of key Foucauldian conceptual constructions. Unfortunately, to my knowledge, there is no critical corpus of work dealing extensively with Foucault and the issue of whiteness. My sense is that Foucault has provided a helpful conceptual framework, particularly as developed in Discipline and Punish and the first volume of The History of Sexuality, for coming to terms with how whiteness, as a power/knowledge nexus, is able to produce new forms of knowledge (in this case "knowledge" about black people) that are productive of new forms of "subjects." On this reading, whiteness, as a power/knowledge nexus with respect to black "selves" and black bodies, produces a philosophical, epistemological, anthropological, phrenological, and political discursive field that "enables a more continuous and pervasive control of what people do, which in turn offers further possibilities for more intrusive inquiry and disclosure." 1

From a genealogical perspective, there is no deep metaphysical mystery or truth about whiteness that remains to be uncovered. As Arnold I. Davidson writes: "Genealogy, that aspect of Foucault's methodology most clearly employed in his later works, has a wider scope than archaeology. Its central area of focus is the mutual relations between systems of truth and modalities of power, the way in which there is a 'political regime' of the production of truth." 2 I aim to examine whiteness as the embodiment and production of specific truth claims, claims that are inextricably linked to a (white) regime of truth and modalities of power.

Divided into two sections, this chapter first provides a genealogical reading of whiteness. This will involve a process of coming to terms with whiteness's historical "positionality." In this way, whiteness, as a presumed "universal" value code, will be shown to consist of an embodied set of practices fueled by a reactive value-creating power. The aim is to call into question the idea that whiteness exists simpliciter. What will be shown is that whiteness creates values, norms, and epistemic frames of reference that unilaterally affirm its many modes of instantiation-political, institutional, aesthetic, and so forth.

I will also explore how whiteness attempts to hide from its historicity and particularity, 3 which I maintain is a function of how whiteness represents itself as "universal." In short, whiteness masquerades as a universal code of beauty, intelligence, superiority, cleanliness, and purity; it functions as a master sign. I will demonstrate how black bodies/selves are produced within the power/knowledge economy of whiteness, how the black body/self is disciplined and how it comes to "know" itself, that is, comes to know the "truth" of itself, as a denigrated thing of absence and existential insignificance. In this sense, I understand American slavery (an expression, among other things, of white ressentiment or hatred) as a form of physical and psychological subjection. The reader will note that my analysis here does not involve the elision of the primary structural profit motive involved in the enslavement of black people. To maintain that the enslavement of black people of African descent was a purely economic, calculative endeavor, a phenomenon reduced to an etic analysis, is too conceptually and historically thin. The economic motive was there, but the formation of whiteness's reactive stance to blackness was a crucial and formative factor. After all, in the European imaginary, blackness signified evil. Social processes of difference and "same-other" dynamics were present in Europe, but the black body provided that which had no trace of whiteness (read: reason, divinity, subjectivity, humanity). 4 Through the existential and institutional terror of slavery, the way blacks came to relate themselves to themselves involved a technique of discipline that not only restricted and prohibited but, more significantly, enabled a certain destructive self-conceptualization. Blacks acquired, in stream with Foucault's analysis of sexuality, "the deep internalization of a carefully orchestrated value-laden understanding of the self."

#### Radical negation of hegemony is insufficient because it only challenges the restrictive elements of anti-blackness- reclaiming a positive black sense of self requires genealogy as a first step to challenge the desiring/disciplining elements of power that produce a certain subjectivity on the black-body- it is only genealogy that create the act of affirmation necessary to overcome the hatred of black bodies

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In Pecola's case, however, it is not radical enough. Pecola is in need of deep psychological liberation. Although critical of the concept of liberation, Foucault does acknowledge its importance in cases involving colonized people. 117 Again, however, he does not acknowledge the need for specific forms of psychological liberation. Colonization is not simply restricted to a set of actions limiting another set of actions; it tears at the very fabric of one's identity. White colonialism establishes its own ideals. Whiteness establishes its own normalizing "truths" which are designed to shape and epistemologically anchor particular ways of knowing and being. Though it is clear that Foucault would not have a formulaic solution to Pecola's situation, he does speak of new pleasures and new bodies. Perhaps by micropolitically examining Pecola's situation, that is, how she has become captivated by the ruse of whiteness, the answer lies in a "counterattack against the deployment" of whiteness. 118 This counterattack as a form of resistance, however, cannot remain at the level of resistance. Simply to resist the hegemonic regime of whiteness is to remain a prisoner to that regime. More is needed. Pecola must also engage in an act of affirmation. So how do we "liberate" Pecola? There is a need to explore, through sustained psychotherapy, the intricate depths of her psychopathology. Psychotherapy, however, must work in conjunction with political resistance, and political resistance must give way to affirmation. She should be encouraged and reinforced to resist the value code of whiteness that has held her prisoner. She will need to conceptually understand how whiteness functions; she will need to see beyond the curtain of whiteness's deception. After all, when it comes to whiteness, there is no great Oz; rather, there are (white) people and their (white) practices backed by institutional and brute force. Her psychological liberation will begin with her rethinking her own individual psychohistory and the history of blacks of African descent more generally. Through the help of genealogy, perhaps she will be able to find a vocabulary to articulate the emergence of whiteness as a façade of universality. In this way, Pecola will be able to disrupt the power/knowledge nexus of whiteness on her body/self. She will come to understand the extent of destructiveness that the desired object of whiteness has had upon her. This, however, is not simply a conceptual endeavor. She will need to explore new and affirmative ways of emoting, feeling, striving, being. This will be done through the appropriation of a new narrative, a narrative of self-love and self-respect; she will come to narrate her identity within the context of a nonwhite hegemonic narrative, a narrative that accents and valorizes (in nonessentialist terms) the ever historically shifting positive modes of what it means to be black. But what

specifically awaits Pecola on the other side of liberation? How will she configure her practices of freedom? Does living her body/self as black create new spaces for living aesthetically and ethically? After all, Foucault will not allow for authentic/inauthentic distinctions in terms of an ontologically core identity. There simply is no authentic/inauthentic self.

For Foucault, once Pecola has genealogically seen through the façade of whiteness, there is no black authentic identity waiting to be discovered. After all, there is no "ontological Black self" which exists beneath the many layers of Pecola's psychopathology. My sense is that Foucault would argue that blackness, like whiteness, is a field of possibilities. On this score, when Pecola moves from a desire for whiteness, indeed, from her illness, she will not cast off one ontologically core identity for another. And, yet, Pecola does not move from wearing one false mask to wearing another false mask. There is a movement from one construction to the next. A construction, however, is not something that we should understand in a facile manner. Her psychopa-thology, under the regime of whiteness, is very real. The white identity that was held up to her as the most glorified object is real. Its reality was enacted, represented, embodied, perpetuated, and sustained within a discursive and nondiscursive field that could not be denied. Indeed, it had its psychological and somatic impact. Once she comes to link her identity to a rich black narrative, this new identity, new way of self-comportment, new way of emoting, feeling, this new way of understanding how her identity can be and ought to be hermeneutically mapped onto historical experiences that constitute the wealth of black people, she will come to embody another very real identity. Pecola will learn that blackness, though itself a field of possibilities, offers narratives that allow for a healthier sense of who she wants to be. Pecola, on this reading, is a relatively open text capable of acts of narrative regeneration. Rejecting those narratives resulting from a reactive value-creating force, Pecola will embody affirmative, ennobling narrative codes and symbols-new ways of being in the flesh-that allow her to further avoid mythopoetic codes created within narrative spaces of white ressentiment. She will reinvent her identity by inhabiting an enabling and ennobling space of being loved for who she is/has become.

#### Their critique is insufficient because it only closes in on the restrictive antagonism of anti-blackness—a necessary condition of transcendence is the ability to see the PRODUCTIVE parts of power that discipline black bodies to internalize inferiority and to crave whiteness- this requires genealogy

Yancy 4

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A genealogical examination of whiteness, following the lead of Foucault and Nietzsche, involves showing how whiteness is not a natural given, or has to do with an ontology that cuts at the joints of nature, but a kind of historical emergence (Entstehung). Upon examination, whiteness, contrary to its historical performance as a natural occurring kind, emerges as a value code deployed by a certain raciated (white) group of people that delimits and structures what it deems intelligible, valuable, normal, abnormal, superior, inferior, beautiful, ugly, and so on. As the presumed sovereign voice, treating itself as hypernormative and unmarked, whiteness conceals its status as raciated, located, and positioned. Because of its presumed ahistorical stability and ontological "givenness, " whiteness is an appropriate target for genealogical examination. Commenting on the value, aim, and practical consequences of genealogy, Alexander Nehamas, with Nietzsche in mind, writes:

Genealogy takes as its objects precisely those institutions and practices which, like morality, are usually thought to be totally exempt from change and development. It tries to show how such changes escape our notice and how it is often in the interest of these practices to mask their specific historical origins and character. As a result of this, genealogy has direct practical consequences because, by demonstrating the contingent character of the institutions that traditional history exhibits as unchanging, it creates the possibility of altering them. 6

Nehamas's point concerning how certain practices attempt to mask themselves is key to understanding whiteness; for the hegemony of whiteness is partly contingent upon its capacity to conceal or mask its own historicity, thus representing itself as universal, decontextual, and ahistorical. With equal insight, Fred Evans writes:

The values and practices that genealogists evaluate present themselves as "universal" or as "true" in an unqualified sense. By revealing the value-creating power that these values and practices serve and disseminate, however, genealogists show their "grounds" or basis-how it was possible for them to appear universal or true without qualification-and their limits, that is, their necessary partiality. In carrying out this critique, moreover, genealogy itself is a value-creating power, one opposed to the "life-denying" and hegemonic tendencies of practices that the genealogy attempts to critically evaluate and overcome. 7

Under the spell of whiteness, blacks internalize a set of values and practices that create a form of self-ressentiment. In short, blacks become, through a process of white discipline, white indoctrination, and sheer white brute force, a reactive force toward their very own being. One wonders how many Africans fully internalized a negative will to power as they crossed the Middle Passage. As will be shown, Pecola Breedlove fully internalized the seductiveness of white beauty as a form of universal normativity. In Foucauldian terms, Pecola's socially constructed self vis-à-vis whiteness imprisons her body. Her body is trapped, as it were, within an internalized reactive value-creating force of self-denigration. All that Pecola sees is her "ugliness, " a construction that is deeply historically embedded in neoclassical conceptions of beauty adopted by both Europe and America. Young Pecola is no match for the powerful aesthetic regime of whiteness. As George M. Frederickson notes: "The milky whiteness of marble and the facial features and bodily form of the Apollos and Venuses that were coming to light during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries created a standard from which Africans were bound to deviate." 8 In short, Pecola sees herself, judges, condemns, and curses her black body as a result of the internalization of the historical norms of whiteness.

More generally, in my genealogical tracing of whiteness, I will demonstrate how whiteness, as a value code of presumed "universality, " serves to create a form of self-hatred in blacks; serves to demonstrate their "natural" inferiority and ugliness; serves to demonstrate that they are bestial by "nature"; serves to demonstrate that they are not entitled to any rights; serves to demonstrate that they are "dirty" and "unclean"; and, indeed, serves to demonstrate that they are "subhuman." As a reactive value-creating power, whiteness, and the "architectonics of its theatre, " as Luce Irigaray might say, creates a distorted black body/self through the use of theories and practices that ontologize certain distorted conceptions of the black body/self. In this way, whiteness is able to conceal the insidious economy of its hegemonic conceptual seductive practices and get blacks to believe that ugliness and inferiority constitute who they are ontologically. This process is reminiscent of what takes place in Foucault's The History of Sexuality, which demonstrates "how members of a society are trained to perceive themselves as having a certain sexual nature through the deployment of theories and practices that define that nature and so determine the realms of the normal and the abnormal." 9 Like the "naturally stupid" and denigrated black body/self under the regime of white racist "scientific" theorizations, sexuality is taken as given, as a thing to be found. Concerning this point, Prado argues that "what establishes the deployed theories and practices as authoritative is that, in being the object of scientific study, sexuality is taken to be something discovered and unveiled rather than constructed and imposed." 10 Whiteness not only functions as the norm for beauty, but it also functions as the norm for reason and rationality and thus as the standard by which black cognitive ability is measured and judged. The norm of whiteness constructs the "inferiority" of the black intellect as an ontological fact which occasions a form of "double consciousness, " as Du Bois argues, that creates black self-doubt and lack of self-confidence. 11

The point here is that black people were subjected to certain regimes of truth that constituted them as objects. Within this regime of truth, dialectically, whites constituted themselves as subjects. We need to come to terms with how black people made the "truths" of the discourse of whiteness their own "truths." In this regard, what Foucault says in Discipline and Punish about the prisoner with regard to panopticism holds true for black people: they are the objects "of information, never a subject in communication." 12 As the "unequals" of whites, blacks are spoken to, not listened to or communicated with. Even before the Middle Passage, black bodies/selves were disciplined to be docile. From the moment that the first black body was placed in shackles, it was being disciplined to embrace the "truth" about its "inferiority." Like the disciplined penitentiary prisoner, the black body/self is kept obedient and disciplined by the process of instilling certain beliefs and habits that produce a new subjectivity, a subjectivity which is imbued with a sense of self-surveillance, a mode of seeing blackness through white eyes. This will be demonstrated in the case of Pecola Breedlove.